- See ZariaMassacre.com memorial website
- Report also alleges Islamic movement infiltration of the Department of State Security, DSS
- The report found the IMN culpable in leading to the clashes
- The report found the Nigerian army dishonest in descritption of event, claim of following Rules of Engagment and acocunt of numbers of victims
Some excerpts from the report are below:
i. The IMN members should primarily be responsible for the
clash and its liabilities
1) Members of the Nigerian Army found to have been involved
in the killings should be brought to trial before a Court of
2) The members of the IMN found to have been involved in the
killing of Cpl. Dan Kaduna Yakubu should also be tried
before a Court of competent Jurisdiction.
3) The Nigerian Army should intensify efforts in ensuring
compliance with the Rules of Engagement and other legal
standards in Cordon and Search operations at all times.
The Kaduna State Government should appoint professional
valuers to re-evaluate properties reported to have been destroyed
or damaged and take appropriate steps to provide necessary
compensation to the claimants.
6.2.3 Nigerian Army (NA)
i) Having regard to the strength of the IMN members or crowd,
they confronted at Hussainiyya Baqiyyatillah, and the
assorted weapons wielded and/or recovered, there appeared
to be a disproportionate use of force by the NA to deal with
the situation. In particular, the actions were contrary to Rules
3 and 4 of the Rules of Engagement, which was supplied to
the Commission by the NA. The actions of troops of the
Nigerian Army were also found to be contrary to Rules of
Proportionality by International Standards.
ii) While the NA might have made a convincing case for the
conduct of the Cordon and Search (C&S) operations, but it
could not justify the high casualty figures sustained on the
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part of the IMN. That the Nigerian Army totally depended on
the oral orders to carry out the C&S operations was found to
be unacceptable to the Commission; oral orders issued by
commanders should be immediately followed by written
orders to ensure compliance to the Rules of Engagement
iii) Although the NA made available a copy of the Rules of
Engagement to guide their C&S operation, there was no
reliable evidence to establish that officers and men who
carried out the C&S operations were sufficiently sensitized to
The NA failed or refused to disclose or record the exact or
estimated number of casualties on the part of IMN as a result
of its operations at Hussainiyya Baqiyatillah, Gyallesu and
Dambo. This must be contrasted with its disclosure of the
exact casualties of its officers and men who suffered from
the same operations.
iv) There were indications of intelligence failure in the overall
assessment of the threats posed by the IMN to national
security and in particular, the potential for conflict on
December 12, 2015 when the COAS was being expected in
Zaria for Passing Out Parade (POP) of recruits at the NA
Depot and would pass by the Hussainiyya Baqiyyatillah.
6.2.5 SSS and Intelligence Community
i) Reluctance on the part of the Security and Intelligence
agencies to provide vital information sorely needed by the
Commission but which is unavailable in the public domain
and not disclosed or gathered from public hearing.
ii) Intelligence failure or inadequacy appears to permeate these
agencies having regard to their threat assessment of the
activities, growth and local and domestic connections of IMN
with foreign powers and organs.
iii) The oft-repeated allegations from the public and boasts by
the IMN of its infiltration of these agencies which suggestions
may well have compromised service delivery, proactive
interventions, interdiction and degrading of their activities or
minimizing the menace they pose, may have affected the
capacities of these agencies.
The Commission, as reflected in TOR (e) above has been able to
establish certain acts of commission or omission by the Nigerian Army in
its clash with the members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria. Some of
those acts identified amongst others were:
1. Disproportionate use of force contrary to the Army‟s own Rules of
Engagement and the International Standard of Proportionality.
2. The high number of casualties cannot be justified.
3. Conducting such operation totally based on oral orders is
unacceptable. Such orders should have subsequently been
confirmed in writing so as to ensure compliance with the Rules of
Engagement and higher commander‟s intentions.
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4. No evidence has been shown to substantiate the notion that the
Army followed its own Rules of Engagement.
5. The Army failed to keep record of recovered casualties on the side
of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria; even as it kept accurate record
of its own.
6. Knowing that the Chief of Army Staff was to attend the Passing out
Parade at the Depot on that day, there was indication of
intelligence failure in the assessment of the threat posed by the
Islamic Movement in Nigeria to National Security as epitomized by
the blockade of the road the COAS was to pass through in Zaria
Whether the actions or inactions of Kaduna State Government as
highlighted above were necessary, appropriate and sufficient in
i. The Commission therefore concludes that the Kaduna State
Government‟s lack of political will to check the menace of the
IMN over the years was inappropriate and insufficient in the
ii. Its burial of 347 dead persons without proper inquest, though
necessary due to health risk it posed if they were not buried,
it was however inappropriate.
iii. The demolition of the Foudiyya School and the Jushi
graveyard of El-Zakzaky‟s mother and sister, which did not
pose any danger to the public was unnecessary and
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iv. Likewise, the Government‟s inability to impose its own
building prohibition notice to the Movement was insufficient
in that the Movement went ahead to erect the said